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LEGAL MISCELLANY.
THE HIGH COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS AND NEGRO SUFFRAGE.
To the B ditors :
The American Law Register of January, 1858, contains an opinion of
the Supreme Judicial Court of the State of MIaine, "on the right of szf-
.frage of persons of African descent." I have not yet read this opinion,
and have nothing to say in regard to it.
At the end of it you subjoin the following note: "This question arose
in Pennsylvania under the constitution of 1790, which gives the right of
suffrage to ' every FREEMAN above the age of 21 years,' and it was held
by the Supreme Court of that State that free negroes were not compre-
hended in those words. Robbs vs. Fogg, 6 Watts, 553, decided in 1837.
The course of reasoning adopted by Chief Justice Gibson, in delivering the
opinion of the court, is substantially the same with that employed by
Judge Taney in the famous Dred Scott case. The same point had arisen
and been decided in 1795, at Philadelphia. See 6 Watts, 555. The
present constitution uses the words ' every white freeman.'"
You have fallen into two mistakes in the matter of this note, as I think
I shall be able to show. The mistakes are not properly your own. You
have derived them from others.
Thefirst of these mistakes is in the date, which you assign to the deci-
sion of Hobls vs. Fogg. It was decided, you say, in 1837.
This is a very natural conclusion, for at the top of several pages of the
report it is distinctly printed in italics, " Sunbury, July, 1837," and af o ot
note of the reporter reads: 11 The report of this case was received too late
'for insertion among the decisions of the Sunbury term, to which it apper-
tains." The truth is, however, that the decision was not made in the year
1837. It was not made as early as February 22, 1838. The true date I
believe to be the 26th or 27th of that month.
On the face of the opinion itself, it is plain that it was not made till
after the new constitution was promulgated. The signatures of the dele-
gates were affixed to this, February 22, 1838.
Now, Chief Justice Gibson speaks of the PnorosD amendments as then
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before the people. The Convention, therefore, had adjourned sine die, (see
the last paragraph of the opinion, page 560 of 6 'Tatts.)
The case of Hrobbs vs. Fogg was argued before the court at Sunbury,, for
it belonged to that district. The count of error was on a judgment of the
Common Pleas for Luzerne county; but the members of the Supreme
Court were so divided in opinion that the case was held under advisement.
The court met at Sunbury1 on the second Monday of July, 1837. At
that time the convention to propose amendments to the constitution of
1790 was sitting at .Harrisburg. A large number of amendments had
been submitted to the convention by Mr. Sterigere, of MKontgomery county,
on the 12th of May, 1837. Among these was one to restrict the right of
suffrage to whites. The whole were laid on the table. On the 23d of
June the same restriction was proposed, as an amendment to another pend-
ing proposal of amendment. This was negatived. A few days afterwards,
(June 28,) an appeal similar to the last brought the subject again before
the convention. It was disagreed to.
An interval of upwards of six months had elapsed, within which the
sittings of the convention were transferred to Philadelphia, before the sub-
ject was again stirred. The labors of the convention were drawing to a
close, when, on January 17, 1838, the question of restricting suffrage to
white freemen was, for the fourth time, brought before the convention. It
excited a long debate, but was in the end carried by a decided majority.
The Supreme Court was then in session also at Philadelphia. llobbs
vs. Fogg was still under advisement. This was well known to the con-
vention. It was alluded to in the debates between the 18th and 23d of
January, 1838, as still pending, by .Mr. Agnew, Mr. Im. Reyart, Doctor
Darlington, and .Mr. Konigmacher. See 9 Debates of Convention, 368,
375, and 10 Debates 46, 133. Judge Boykinson, also a member of the
Convention, bad, as was said by Doctor Darlington, also referred to the
pendency of this cause before the Supreme Court. :He had stated that the
Court was divided upon it.
But there is further evidence on this subject, evidence which must be
regarded as decisive. It comes from -ir. Watts, the reporter of the deci-
sion. The newspapers of the day contain a letter from Mr. Watts, dated
February 27, 1838, in which he says "the opinion was written by Ghief
Justice Gibson, and delivered to me too late for the volume which has just
left the press;" and he adds, "I send it to you for publication." This
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letter, and the opinion as it stands now in 6 Watts' Reports, 553, may be
found, probably, in every newspaper of that period. Both may be seen in
the Philadelphia Gazette of March 7, 1838, now at the Philadelphia
Library.
After he had thus sent the opinion to the newspapers, the reporter dis-
covered, no doubt, that it might be added to the "1 volume which had just
left the press," and this was accordingly done. The case is the last in the
volume.
By this means a speedy, as well as authentic publicity, was imparted to
the document. The natural impression of every one, on finding it where
it is, with the accompanying denotement, " Sunbury, July, 1837," and
the superadded foot note of the reporter, is that the decision was given
forth more than half a year earlier than the actual time. The truth of
juridical history requires the removal of this erroneous impression.
The second mistake which I desire to correct is of much greater moment.
It is found in this statement in your note: "The same point had arisen
and been decided in the same way in 1795, at Philadelphia."
You had authority for this assertion quite as strong as tbat which existed
in respect to the first mistake. You refer to that authority, and I proceed,
therefore at once to examine it. Ohief Justice Gibson's published opinion
in Hobbs vs. Fogg constitutes your authority. He there states: "About
the year 1795, as I have it from James Gibson, Esg., of the Philadelphia
bar, the very point before us was ruled by the High Court of Errors and
Appeals against the right of negro suffrage. Mr. Gibson declined an invi-
tation to be concerned in the argument, and therefore has no memorandum
of the cause to direct us to the record. I have had the office searched for
it, but the papers had fallen into such disorder as to preclude a hope of its
discovery. Most of them were imperfect, and many were lost or misplaced.
But Mr. Gibson's remembrance of the decision is perfect, and entitled to
full confidence. That the case was not reported is probably owing to the
fact that the judges gave no reasons." 6 Watts, 555.
Here a great constitutional question is made to depend upon the preca-
rious memory of an individual far advanced in life, in respect not to some
startling fact, but to an isolated opinion expressed nearly half a century
previously.
Is there good ground to believe that such a decision, as Mr. Gibson
spoke of, was ever made?
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I maintain the vegative of this proposition.
1. 11r. Gibson remembers but a single incident which by possibility
could assist his recollection. He can recall no other. " He declined an
invitation to be concerned in the argument." Who invited him? He
does not know. Why did he decline the invitation? He gives no reason.
le was a young man, with a fair share of practice, but who could not
certainly plead the pressure of business as an excuse.
2. At the time when Mr. Gibson brought forth this recollection, he had
been out of practice as a lawyer for a very long space of time. His mind,
in that interval, had been devoted to a harassing, distracting, and unfor-
tunate business, wholly alien from the solution of questions of jurispru-
dence. * And it is matter of general observation, that such a retirement is
fatal to accuracy of knowledge, if not in the principles of the law, yet cer-
tainly so of solitary decisions of the courts. When that profound jurist,
Sir William Grant, a year and a half after he was made Master oJ t&e.
Bolls, was asked his opinion on a point of law, his reply was, "Probably
the law is so and so. But my opinion is not worth a rush, I have been i
above a year out of practice."
8. When Mr. Gibson mentioned the decision, a considerable number of
members of the bar were living, whose age and habits of life placed them
on a level with him, as to the knowledge of judicia decisions of the period
he referred to. Not one of these appears to have heard of it. Judge
Ropkinson, in particular, who was born in 1770 or 1771, was a member
of the convention which proposed the amendments to the constitution of
1790. One of these was on the very subject of the elective franchise.
It restricted the right to whites. The debates of the convention show that
he participated earnestly in the discussion of this amendment. -He. ad.
verted to the pendency of .Hobbs vs. Fogg, then in the Supreme Court.
Yet his recollection could not be quickened in respect to. any similar ques-
tion authoritatively ruled in the High Court of Errors and Appeals. Mr.
Cope, though not alawyer, was also a member of the convention in 1837-8,,
and he was keenly alive to the question of negro suffrage. He was of such
an age when the constitution of 1790 was formed, and had.taken so much.
interest in the proceedings of the convention then, that he remembered and
recounted a memorable incident of the debate connected with an effort then
made to limit suffrage to whites. He was a resident of the City of Philadelphia
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from that period to the day of his death, which occurred but a few years
ago. Yet he had no knowledge of the decision in 1795, which M1fr. Gibson
recollected.
But I shall recur to this topic again.
4. I come now to a source of information which is more direct and
wholly unimpeachable.
When, as sometimes happens, reference is made by counsel to unre-
ported cases, the practice of the courts is to have the records examined.
Chief Justice Gibson considered this course a necessary one, in order to
verify or disprove the recollection of Mr. James Gibson. Accordingly, as
he says, he had the office searched. But the effort was unsuccessful.
Hear the reason which he assigns for the inauspicious result: "the papers
had fallen into such disorder as to preclude a hope of its (Mr. Gibson's
case) discovery. Most of them were imperfect, and many were lost or
misplaced."
The Chief Justice seems to have directed this search without reflecting
upon the functions and purpose of the High Court of Errors and Appeas.
What kind of papers could he have expected to find among the records of
a court, instituted as a Court of Revision, and for nothing else. The Act
of Assembly of 1791, by which the court was constituted, reguired the
records of all cases, after an affirmance or reversal of a judgment of the
court below, to be remitted to such court. This is the common and neces-
sary practice of all common law courts of review. If, therefore, any such
decision had been made by the High Court of Errors and Appeals, as Mr.
Gibson spoke of, and full and authentic information in regard to it was
desired, the proper office to be searched was not in the High Court of'
Errors and Appeals, but in the Supreme Court, on whose judgment
the writ of error must have been taken; or if the cause had or qinated
in a Court of Common Fleas, the record would most probably be found
there. The reason, therefore, assigned by the Chief Justice for dispensing
with authentic evidence to corroborate the recollection of Mr. Gibson, is
inadequate and inapplicable.
But a search in the office of the Prothonotary of the Supreme Court
(which by the Act of Assembly abolishing the Digh Court-of Errors and
Appeals, is made the depository of all books and papers which had be-
longed to the High Court,) would have brought to light in a moment, an
authentic record of all the business ever transacted there.
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This book is labelled C1 Docket of the Righ Court of Errors and Ap-
peals," and contains not only the names of all the cases brought into the
court, but full minutes of all the proceedings which took place in relation
to them. The day or days on which each case was argued-what counsel
spoke, and in what order, are carefully set down.
A court bearing the name of the High Court of Errors and .Appeals
was established under the constitution of 1776. Its principal business was
of admiralty jurisdiction. Upwards of sixty pages of this book are occu-
pied with the proceedings of that court.
On the 13th of April, 1791, a court with the same name was erected
under the constitution of 1790. Its jurisdiction was restricted to writs of
error on judgments of the Supreme Court, and to appeals from decrees of
the several Registers' courts of the Commonwealth. Thefirst session was
directed to take place, and did take place, on November 1, 1791. A stated
session was prescribed every year, to commence on the 2d Monday of July,
and adjourned courts might be held by appointment of the judges at any
other time. It consisted at the time of twelve judges, namely, four, (being
the whole number), of the judges of the Supreme Court-the Presidents
of the Courts of Common Pleas, which at the first comprehended but five
-and three judges were specially appointed by the Governor. One of the
provisions of the act of Assembly was, that a judge who had taken part in
the decision of the case in the subordinate court, was incompetent to assist
in a review of the same case.
A necessary result of this last provision, was, that a guorum, although
butfive were requisite for this purpose, was diffiedlt to be obtained. Pages
of the minutes consist of the names of the judges who were in attendance,
but who, without transacting any business, adjourned from day to day; on
a few occasions, for as many as nine or ten consecutive juridical days. Even
when a quorum was in attendance at the opening of the court, it sometimes
happened on the calling on of a particular case, that one, two, and perhaps
more of the judges then present, were incapacitated to participate in the
hearing. In the early years of its existence, the practice was in such cir-
cumstances for the disqualified judges to retire, and thus the court would
be broken up for want of the quorum. But subsequently, as appears from
a note to Hannum vs. Spear, 1 Yeates, 569, the disgualified judges sat when
necessary to make the quorum, but took no part in the decisions.
I have entered into these details, to prevent the surprise which the
reader must otherwise feel, in being told that very little business w*s ever
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transacted by this court. From the careful manner in which the minutes
were kept, there is no difficulty in ascertaining whether a particular case
was ever before the court, and if so, what disposition was made of it.
I have, on at least four occasions, carefully examined the contents of the
docket and minute book of this court. Within the last fortnight, I have
looked at every entry it contains, from the first meeting of the court, on
November 1, 1791, to thefinalone, July 2, 1808.
The constitution of 1790 was signed by the delegates, September 2,
1790, and the first election under it was held on the 2d Tuesday of October,
in that year. Although Mr. Gibson names "about the year 1795" as the
date of the alleged decision, I have thought it best, in order that no doubt
might remain on the subject, to begin my examination with thefirst meet-
ing of the court, November 1, 1791. The commission of Benjamin Chew,
appointed by the Governor as one of the three special judges of the court,
is there inserted at length. Mr. Chew was the President of the court.
Only two cases were then docketed. Both of these were appeals from
the Register's Court. Mr. Gibson's case, of course, was not one of these.
The next meeting was at an adjourned court, March 30, 1792. No
cases, except the two before mentioned, from a Register's Court, are men-
tioned, and these were continued.
July 9, 1792, (page 67). The same two cases from Register's Court
are again noticed.
Two additional cases here appear. 1. The Commonwealth vs. Lecaze,
which was argued at great length. It is reported in 1 Yeates 55, under the
name Republicas vs. Le'aze, and in Addison's Rep. 59, entitled Pennsyl-
vania vs. Lecaze. The title of this case, as well as the reports, prove that
this was not Mr. Gibson's case. The remaining case, Cummins vs. Dunn, is
an ejectment. Court adjourned to Sept. 17th, 1792, when it again met.
Two cases were here finally disposed of, viz., -Peirce vs. Eachus, and
Lawrence vs. Morrison. Both were appeals from Register's Courts.
The decision in Commonwealth vs. Lecaze, was postponed to July, 1793,
there not being a quorum present of those competent to decide it. Nothing
else was done but the assignments of errors-or rather rules on plain-
tiffs in error, to assign the errors.
Eight cases here mentioned, (none of which, however, were argued,) may
be put aside by stating that three were from Register's Courts. Two
were ectments-one aforeign, attachment-one is marked settled, and the
last, affirmed by CONSENT, without any argument.
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Four were argued, viz., Josepqson vs. Rogers. . In this the case was dock-
eted, errors assigned, argument had, and the judgment affirmed on the
same day. The counsel were Mr. Heatly and Mr. Todd. There is enough
here to satisfy any one that this was not Mr. Gibson's case. Besides, it
was two years earlier than the time he fixes. Gibbs vs. Walker, the
foreign attachment, is reported, (when before the Supreme Court) as Walker
vs. Gibbs, I Yeates, 255 ; 2 Dall. 211.
Fitzgerald vs. Caldwell, (reported in 1 Yeates, 274; 2 Dall. 215, and
Addison, 119,) was before the court at this term.
Dunlap vs. Flanagan, from the Register's Court, was also argued; and
Stone vs. Fury, (reported in 1 Yeates, 186, 187; 2 Dall. 184; Addison,
114,) was then decided.
This comprises the whole business of the court at that session.
July/, 1794. No case was argued at this court. An appeal from a
Register's Court, and two ejectments, are noticed on the docket i and a
judgment was confessed, or, rather, a judgment for a specified amount in
pounds, shillings and pence, was agreed upon by counsel, according to the
minutes. Properly, I suppose, the judgment in the court below ought to
have been affirmed; but this was not done, and I find, in the next year,
the case was non.prossed. Beyond all doubt, this was not Hr. Gibson's
case.
July 14, 1795. The court again met. This is the year named by .Mr.
Gibson. Not a single case was then argued; seven cases only are men-
tioned at all. Of these, two were appeals from a Register's Court, three
were ejectments, the sixth was against an executor. The remaining case is
Eannum, vs. Spear, a case well known to the profession. It is reported
in 1 Yeates, 553, and 2 Dall. 291. At an adjourned court, on September
17, 1795, it was decided.
In 1796, the court met on 11th July, and there are entries of adjourn-
ments from day to day, on every juridical day to the 25th of the month
without the transaction of any business. When, at last, it proceeded to
business, there is no trace of any argument having taken place. In twenty
cases, judgments are stated to have been affirmed By CONSENT. Three are
marked settled. In one, the Commonwealth was a party. One is against
an executor, and is, besides, a contest upon a will-an appeal from a
Register's Court.
It is abundantly plain that Mr. Gibson's case was not among these.
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In 1797, Ball vs. Vasse, an insurance cause, reported 2 Yeates, 178,
and 4 Dall. 270, is mentioned.
Twenty-one judgments were affirmed by consent; two marked settled;
one, "not to be brought forward;" one is against a husband and wife;
one, a question as to costs merely, and in one a party is styled a devisee.
Three cases were argued-1. McPherson vs. McPherson, reported in
Addison's Rep. 327, the parties to which were numerous, and most of
them ladies; 2. Ball vs. Vasse, before mentioned, and the case against
husband and wife.
In 1798, the court sat but one day, and affirmed numerous judgments.
In many of these-and such is the case throughout the minutes-one or
both of the parties are styled, indorser, indorsee, surety, devisee, executor,
surviving partner, and the like. Such designations exclude Mr. Gibson's
case.
No argument was had at this court.
In 1799 a single case was argued. This was Livezey vs. Gorgas, in
which the judgment was reversed at the next court. See 4 Dall. 71.
Several judgments were affirmed by consent.
1800, January 15. An adjourned court was held. Ewing, who sur-
vived his wife, (says the docket,) vs. Bouston. The judgment was
affirmed, and this, with the reversal of the judgment in Livezey vs.
Gorgas, above noticed, constituted the sum of the business then trans-
acted.
1800, July. The court sat but one day. Some judgments were affirmed
by consent; but no argument took place.
1801. The court sat but two days. A considerable number of judg-
ments were affirmed by consent; but there was no argument. Court
adjourned, says Mr. Dallas, from July, 1801, to January, 1802, for want
of a quorum. See 4 Dali. 76, note.
1802, January. An adjourned court. Three causes were argued,
namely, Burd vs. Smith's Lessee, reported 4 Dall. 76; Bank of North
America vs. .lorris, and Negro Flora vs. Graisberry's Executors.
1802, July. Three cases, in each of which the plaintiffs were the same,
were very numerous, and ladies. In two of these cases the defendants
were also ladies. The cases may be given briefly as .Hassenclever vs.
Maria Clifton, The Same vs. Francis 'Clifton, and The Same vs.
Elizabeth Tucker.
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With the exception of these three, which were argued, nothing special
took place at this session.
1803, January. An adjourned court, at which an ejeetment cause,
Potts vs. Barris, was argued, but no other case.
1803, July. Two cases, Davis vs. Commonwealth, and i. American
Bank vs. Jones, were partially argued. No other business of a special
nature.
1804, January. An adjourned court met on the 9th inst., and met
and adjourned from day to day, without doing any business, till the 20th
inst., when Davis vs. Commonwealth, and North American Bank vs.
Jones, were again before the court, and the arguments concluded.
Three other cases-azlehurst vs. Dallas, -tazlehurst vs. Lea, .lazle-
hurst v. Yard, were also argued.
The names of the parties, and the grouping together of these three cases,
is a sufficient reason for saying that Mr. Gibson's case was not one of them.
1804, July. The court sat but one day, and no cause was argued.
1804, Dec. 31, and Jan. 2, 1805. The minutes show nothing more
than that a rule of court was then adopted.
1805, July. Only three judges met; after several adjournments, for
want of a quorum, adjourned sine die.
1806, July. Chief Justice TILGMaAN toot his seat. Nothing was done,
except the granting of a few motions, and the entry of a non pros. There
was no argument. Adjourned to Dec. 29, 1806.
1806, December. An adjourned court. But no quorum appeared.
1807, July. HoN. BIRD WILSON, as President of the Court of Com-
mon Pleas of Montgomery, Bucks, &c., took his seat.
N ine cases, to wit,
1. Summer vs. Ritchie; 6. Hauer's Lesseevs. Scheetz;
2. Dempsey vs. Insurance Co.; 7. Gallagher vs. Hamilton, 4 Yeates,
8. Ritchie vs. Summers; 202;
4. Commonwealth vs. Rittenhouse; 8. Guier vs. Pearce;
5. N. American Bank vs. Jones; 9. Miller vs. Pearce,
were severally argued at this session. Dempsey vs. Ins. Co., is reported
1 Binney, 300; Ritchie vs. Summers, reported in 3 Yeates, 531, and
Summers vs. Ritchie, probably a cross action; Hauer's lessee vs. Scheetz,
was an ejectment, and is a memorable case, reported 3 Yeates, 205, 2
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Binney, 532; Gallagher vs. Hamilton, see Bamilton vs. Gallagher, 4
Yeates, 202.
As to Guier vs. Pearce, and Miller vs. Pearce, the defendant being the
same in these cases, there is no probability that either of these was Mr. Gib-
son's case. In point of date, this was twelve years after his case.
No other cases were argued.
1808, June 20. An adjourned court.
Dempsey vs. Ins. Co., was again partially argued, and Xfiller vs. Nichols,
in which counsel appeared for the United States, were the only cases
argued.
The final sitting of this court took place July 2, 1808, at which several
judgments were entered. And an Act of Assembly, passed February 24,
1806, having forbidden the Judges to entertain any new cause after its
date, and required them to determine all the causes then depending within
two terms, the functions of the court ceased. The requirement to determine
the causes depending, will account for the argument of the nine cases above
mentioned, at July term, 1807. Even including this term of extra dili-
gence, it will be found that during the whole period of its existence, from
Nov. 1, 1791, to July 2, 1808, nearly seventeen years, the entire number
of causes which were argued before it, was but thirty-three. The names
of these cases are comprised in the subjoined list:
1. Commonwealth vs. Lecaze.
2. Lawrence vs. Morrison.
3. Josephson vs. Rogers.
4. Stone vs. Fury.
5. Grubb vs. McCullogh.
6. Hannum vs. Spear.
7. McPherson vs. McPherson.
8. Ball vs. Vasse.
9. Livezey vs. Gorgas.
10. Ewing's Lessee vs. Houston.
11. Burd vs. Smith's Lessee.
12. Bank of N. America vs. Norris.
13. Neglo Flora vs. Graisberry's Execu-
tors.
14. Potts vs. Harris.
15. Davis vs. Commonwealth.
16. N. American Bank vs. Jones.
17. Hazlehurst vs. Dallas.
18. Hazlehurst vs. Lea.
19. Hazlehurst vs. Yard.
20. Hassenclever vs. Clifton.
21. Hassenclever vs. Clifton.
22. Hassenclever vs. Tucker.
23. Summers vs. Ritchie.
24. Fitzgerald vs. Caldwell.
25. Dempsey vs. Ins. Co.
26. Ritchie vs. Summers.
27. Commonwealth vs. Rittenhouse.
28. N. American Bank vs. Jones. (See
No. 16. Probably this was a re-
argument.
29. Hauer's Lessee vs. Scbeetz.
30. Gallagher vs. Hamilton.
31. Guier vs. Pearce.
82. Miller vs. Pearce.
33. Miller vs. Nichols.
Eleven of these, it has been shown, have been reported.
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It is not likely that any one, after a proper examination of the evidence
which I have adduced, will continue to believe that .Mr. Gibson's recollec-
tion was at all reliable.
But there is another kind of.evidence which, under the circumstances,
possesses a strength, not to say a positiveness, which must lead the mind
to the same conclusion.
In 1817, an election for Governor of this Commonwealth occurred, which
was contested with great earnestness. The majority for the successful
candidate was unusually small.
The vanquished party, encouraged by the smallness of this majority, was
induced to question the fairness of the election. It was openly alleged,
and this the newspapers of the day avouch, that in one election district in
particular fifty votes had been given by colored persons. They were known
to have been particularly friendly to the successful candidate. The factof
such persons having been in the practice of voting at that district for years
before, was conceded. It was well known, too, that to some extent similar
voting had been allowed in several other places. In Philadelphia, and in
the greater part of the State, no such practice had ever existed. Indeed,
with the exception of an inconsiderable number of colored persons, who
were the owners of real estate, the whole class was effectually excluded by the
purposed omission of the assessor to tax them. Without having been
assessed, no one, be his color what it might, could claim a right to vote.
NZegroes, as a body, FoR THE VERY PURPOSE, openly avowed and generally
approved, of preventing them from claiming this right, were passed over
by the assessors. The few who, as owners of real estate, were, I believe,
assessed, were considerate and respectable men, who were guided by the
counsel of the true friends of their color, in never presenting themselves
at the polls.
At the time of the election referred to, there must have been some thou-
sands living in the State, and in full vigor of intellect, who were in the
prime of life in 1795, only 22 years before.
Of the bar alone in this city there were, falling within this category,
Jared Ingersoll, William Lewis, William Rawle, Peter S. Duponceau,
Joseph B. McKean, Joseph Hopkinson, Benjamin R. Morgan, Aloses Levy,
Jonathan TV. Conly, William .E. Todd, John Hallowell, Walter Franklin,
John Read, Joseph Reed, and in other parts of the State James Ross,
of Pittsburg, Samuel Sitgreaves apd John Ross, of Easton, YIomas
Duncan, Charles Smith and James Hopkins, of Lancaster, John Marks
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Biddle and CMarles Evans, of Reading, Thomas Ross, of Montgomery
county, and Abraham Chapman, of Bucks county, nearly all of whom had
a large practice in their day.
Not one of all these, (although many of them were decided politicians,
and most of them of the party opposed to the successful candidate for Go-
vernor in 1817,) ever, so far as I have heard, pretended to the least recol-
lection of such a decision as Mr. Gibson mentioned. If any thing could
have quickened their memories, the universally conceded fact that negro
votes had been then given, and had contributed to the defeat of one of the
candidates, would certainly have been sufficient.
I have a vivid remembrance of a conversation on the very subject of
negro suffrage, growing out of the election of 1817. It occurred in the
interval between the election and the inauguration of the Governor, or
very soon afterwards. James Ross, of Pittsburg, Judges Gibson and Dun-
can, and Judge Hallowell, were all present, and participated in the con-
versation. They all agreed there could not be a question as to the right
of negroes to vote under the then constitution. They all agreed, too, that
the right had been occasionally exercised-that in a few counties it was
constantly exercised. Judge Gibson stated that he knew an old colored
man who had voted at the general election year after year, and he said
his right was unquestionable.
James Ross had been a member of the Convention which formed the
constitution of 1790. He was, besides, an intimate friend of Judge
Addison, who had been a member of the same convention. Judge Addi-
son appears to have attended at most, if not all, the sessions of the High
Court of Errors and Appeals from 1791 to 1803. If a question on negro
suffrage had come before that court, is it not likely that Judge Addison
would have mentioned it to Hr. Ross, his co-laborer in forming the con-
stitution? They both resided at Pittsburg.
But Mr. Ross, had no knowledge, in 1817, of such a decision.
The name of Judge Duncan appears on the minutes of the High Court
of Errors and Appeals, as counsel for an appellant in 1792, and the cause
was not decided for several years. He, however, had never heard of Mir.
Gibson's case.
Is it credible that such a question could have occurred, that such a deci-
sion could have been made in the city of Philadelphia, and yet no one have
ever heard of it but James Gibson?
What explanation can be given, then, it may be asked, for the belief of
.Mr. Gibson, that such a decision was made.
NEGRO SUFFRAGE.
It is freely conceded, that Mr. Gibson had such a belief-that he was
entirely sincere in communicating it to the C7ief Justice, as a verity. I
am equally certain, however, that he was mistaken, and his mistake I
think, may be satisfactorily accounted for. In the year 1795, the very
year which Mr. Gibson mentions, a writ de homine replegiando was brought
into the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. It was entitled negro -lora vs.
Joseph Graisberr,. On the 15th of December, 1797, the trial came on
when a special verdict was found, and at March Term, 1798, judgment
was entered for the defendant, on the verdict "for the purpose as it is
stated on the record, Cc of an appeal to the IHigh Court of Errors and
Appeals, and that the justices of this court may there assist in hearing
and determining it." The case was accordingly carried up to the Bigh
Court of Errors and Appeals, and was there argued, as the minutes show,
for four sittings of the court. The counsel for the plaintiff were Jared
Ingersoll, William Rawle, and Rilliam Lewis, Esquires. The argument
began January 20, 1802.
The judges of the Supreme Court, (who it would appear by the record
of that court, as above cited, had supposed that by giving a judgment pro
forma, they would not be precluded from taking part in the decision in
the fHigh Court, judged it not proper afterwards to do so,) although their
presence is noted, did not as is mentioned, participate in the decision in
the .High Court. Five judges, most of them Presidents of the Courts of
Common Pleas, AFIRMED the judgment of the Supreme Court.
The minutes of the .Eigh Court of Errors and Appeals, show that no
reasons were given for their opinion, but it was announced by the President,
"1 that it was their unanimous opinion, slavery was not inconsistent with
any clause of the Constitution of Pennsylvania."
The ground upon which this replegiando was .taken, was, the first section
of the "declaration of rights."
On first blush, this declaration seems to require a contrary decision to
that which was given. And so in 1780 it was considered in Massachusetts
-the bill of rights of which, is in nearly the same words. Winchenden vs.
Eatcfild, 4 Mass. Rep. 129. Many years ago, when the case of negro
Flora vs. Graisberr, was first brought to my notice, I thought, and so
expressed myself, that the decision of the High Court of Appeals was
wrong. On a more deliberate consideration, now at a more mature age, I
see great reason to doubt the soundness of my earlier opinion.
The circumstances of this case, as I have said, will explain the mistake
